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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
William Glen Leer appeals from the district court's order denying his 
petition for post-conviction relief contending the district court erred in concluding 
he did not receive ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. 
Course Of The Underlvinq Criminal Proceedinqs (Docket No. 31559') 
The state charged Leer with trafficking in more than 400 grams of 
methamphetamine, trafficking in more than 28 grams of cocaine, trafficking in five 
or more pounds of marijuana, unlawful possession of a firearm, and resisting and 
obstructing officers following an encounter in which the officers discovered nearly 
$10,000 in cash, numerous items of drug paraphernalia, 2608.29 grams (5.75 
pounds) of marijuana, 1842.6 grams (4.06 pounds) of methamphetamine, 147.99 
grams (5.28 ounces) of cocaine, and a handgun in Leer's possession. (#31559 
R., pp.23-25, 46-47; Prelim. Tr., p.15, L.2 - p.16, L.22, p.23, L.22 - p.28, L.18, 
p.33, L.1 - p.34, L.22, p.37, L.8 - p.39, L.25; Ada County Sheriffs Supplemental 
Report, pp.3-4.) Leer filed a motion to suppress, which the district court denied. 
(#31559 R., pp.32-33, 43-55.) Leer thereafter entered a conditional guilty plea to 
trafficking in more than 400 grams of methamphetamine, reserving his right to 
appeal "the probable cause finding . , . and all evidentiary rulings" at the 
' Contemporaneous with his brief, Leer filed a motion to augment the record with 
"the record from State v. William Leer, No. 31559, including the Clerk's Record 
on Appeal, the transcript of the preliminary hearing held June 3, 2004, the 
transcript of the hearing on the motion to suppress held September 17, 2004, the 
Brief in Support of Motion to Suppress filed October 1, 2004, and the State's 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress filed October 1, 2004." (Motion to 
Augment the Record dated February 18, 2009.) Leer's motion is still pending. 
preliminary hearing, and the denial of his motion to suppress.' (#31559 R., 
pp.68-69.) The court accepted Leer's plea and entered judgment, imposing a 
unified twenty-year sentence with ten years fixed. (R., pp.70-71.) Leer 
appealed. (#31559 R., pp.75-78.) 
On appeal, Leer, represented by Erik Lehtinen, Deputy State Appellate 
Public Defender, raised a single claim - excessive sentence. (#31559, 
Appellant's Brief.) The ldaho Court of Appeals affirmed Leer's sentence, State v. 
&, 2006 Unpublished Opinion No. 348, and the ldaho Supreme Court denied 
review on April 19, 2006 (#31559, Order Denying Petition for Review dated April 
19, 2006). The Remittitur issued the same day. (#31559, Remittitur dated April 
19, 2006.) 
Course Of Post-Conviction Proceedings 
Leer, through counsel, filed an untimely petition for post-conviction relief 
on October 2, 2007. (R., pp.5-7.) In his petition, Leer alleged his appellate 
counsel was ineffective in failing to raise the "issue regarding the denial of his 
motion to suppress." (R., p.7.) Leer further claimed appellate counsel's failure to 
do so led him to "plead guilty on a false promise that the issue would be litigated 
and when it was not his plea was rendered involuntary." (R., p.7.) Attached to 
Leer's petition was a letter from Lehtinen to Leer dated July 31, 2006 ("2006 
Letter") in which Lehtinen advised Leer: 
In recent weeks I have come to realize that my performance in 
prosecuting your direct appeal may have been inadequate, thus 
giving rise to a post-conviction claim of ineffective assistance of 
ZThe state dismissed the remaining charges. (#31559 R., p.70.) 
appellate counsel for you. As you may recall, you entered into a 
conditional guilty plea, expressly reserving your right to appeal the 
denial of your suppression motion, under the assumption that the 
suppression issue would, in fact, be appealed. However, when I 
reviewed your case, I concluded that the suppression issue was 
frivolous and, thus, did not raise it on appeal. I am afraid that by 
failing to raise the suppression issue for you, I may have 
inadvertently rendered your guilty plea unknowing and involuntary, 
perhaps entitling you to either withdraw your plea or have a new 
appeal wherein the suppression issue is raised. 
Unfortunately for you, I stand by my assessment (outlined in my 
October 26, 2005 letter to you) that the suppression issue would 
not have been viable on appeal. Nevertheless, since you entered a 
guilty plea based on your expectation that that issue would be 
appealed, it seems to me that you should have some recourse now. 
(R., p.17.) 
The state filed an answer and motion for summary dismissal. (R., pp.19- 
20, 25-32.) In its motion, the state asserted Leer's petition was untimely3 and 
that Leer failed to establish his plea was involuntary or appellate counsel was 
ineffective. (R., pp.25-32.) The court determined Leer was entitled to equitable 
tolling of the statute of limitation, denied the state's motion for summary 
dismissal, and scheduled the matter for an evidentiary hearing. (3/14/08 Tr., 
p.17, L.24 - p.19, L.9.) Following the evidentiary hearing, the court entered a 
written order denying relief concluding Mr. Lehtinen was not ineffective. (R., 
pp.70-71.) Leer timely appealed. (R., pp.73-75.) 
' The state's motion for summary dismissal erroneously indicates the Remittitur 
issued June 9, 2006. (R., p.31.) As noted, the Remittitur issued April 19, 2006. 
(#31559, Remittitur.) June 9, 2006, is the date the Remittitur was filed in the 
district court. (a Register of Actions, State v. Leer, Ada County Case No. CR- 
FE-2004-0000755 (Appendix A).) This error is, however, of no consequence 
since the petition was also untimely using June 9, 2006, as the Remittitur date. 
ISSUES 
Leer states the issues on appeal as: 
1. . Was William denied constitutionally effective assistance of 
appellate counsel when counsel did not argue on appeal that the 
District Court erred in denying William's suppression motion given 
that the arrest and search of William violated state and federal 
constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures? 
U.S. Const. Amend. 4, 14, Idaho Const. Art. 1, § 17. 
2. In the alternative, was William denied constitutionally 
effective assistance of appellate counsel when appellate counsel 
acted, without any strategic purpose, to vitiate the Rule 11 plea 
agreement William had entered by denying William the bargained 
for benefit of appellate review of the suppression motion? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.8.)  
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Should the district court have dismissed Leer's petition as untimely? 
2. Did the district court correctly conclude Leer's appellate counsel did 
not render ineffective assistance? 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Leer's Petition Should Have Been Dismissed As Untimely 
A. Introduction 
The district court denied the state's motion to dismiss Leer's petition as 
untimely, concluding Leer was entitled to equitable tolling. (3114108 Tr., pp.17- 
19.) Because the district court erroneously determined Leer was entitled to 
tolling, this Court should affirm the denial of post-conviction relief on the basis 
that Leer's petition was untimely 
B. Standard Of Review 
"[R]eview of the district court's construction and application of the time 
limitation aspects of the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act is a matter of 
free review." Person v. State, --- P.3d ----, 2009 WL 918519 * I  (Ct. App. 2009) 
(citing Martinez v. State, 130 ldaho 530, 532, 944 P.2d 127, 129 (Ct. App. 1997); 
Freeman v. State, 122 ldaho 627, 628, 836 P.2d 1088, 1089 (Ct. App. 1992)). 
C. The District Court Should Have Dismissed Leer's Petition As Untimely 
A petition for post-conviction relief must be filed "within one (1) year from 
the expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or 
from the determinafion of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later." 
I.C. 5 19-4902. The failure to file a timely petition for post-conviction relief is a 
basis for dismissal of the petition. Evensiosky v. State, 136 ldaho 189, 190-191, 
30 P.2d 967,968-969 (2001). 
The Remittitur in Leer's directappeal issued on April 19, 2006. (#31559 
Remittitur.) Leer, therefore, had until April 19, 2007, to file his petition for post- 
conviction relief. On March 29, 2007, rather than filing a petition, Leer filed a 
typewritten "Motion for Appointment of Counsel to Assist in the Petitioner's Initial 
Application for Post Conviction Relief with Statements and Affidavits in Support 
Therein" (hereinafter "Motion for Counsel"). (R., p.35.) In his Motion for Counsel, 
Leer stated, in part: 
Petitioner has been diagnosed with a condition of enabling 
mental impairment that inhibits his speech, thought process, and 
ability to reason. If Petitioner is forced to exert his limited mental 
capacity other than the simplicity of daily routine, a short circuit in 
the thought process develops causing Petitioner to go into a 
seizure. This existing medical problem was brought about by a [sic] 
accidentlinjury here atlSCl [sic] on 4/17/06. This injury has left the 
Petitioner with a severely diminished mental capacity to undertake 
any Legal [sic] preparations or litigations in his own behalf. 
(R., p.35.) 
The Motion for Counsel indicates Leer prepared the document himself, 
and Leer's motion included citations to relevant legal authority. (R., pp.35-38.) 
Leer also supported his motion with affidavits from two other inmates indicating 
Leer has difficulty remembering, is easily confused, and has seizures when he is 
"under pressure." (R., pp.40-44.) In addition, Leer attached a copy of Lehtinen's 
2006 Letter to his motion, as well as, a letter from Layne Davis, Leer's trial 
counsel, to Lehtinen dated November 2, 2005, "alert[ingln Lehtinen to his failure 
to include the suppression issue in his Appellant's Brief, which Leer preserved as 
part of his plea and which Mr. Davis specifically included in his notice of appeal. 
(R., pp.45-47.) 
On April 2, 2007, the court issued a notice of its intent to deny Leer's 
request for counsel due to Leer's failure to accompany his Motion for Counsel 
with an affidavit establishing his indigency. (R., pp.48-49.) The court's notice 
further indicated, "if [Leer] is able to demonstrate that he is indigent, [he] would 
be entitled to counsel to help him prepare his post-conviction petition." (R., 
pp.48-49.) Leer filed proof of his indigency on April 13, 2007 (R., pp.51-56), and 
the district court entered an order appointing counsel on May 9, 2007, which was 
served on the "Public Defender" and Leer. (R., pp.57-58.) On July 18, 2007, the 
Ada County Public Defender sent a letter to Leer notifying him his case had 
"been conflicted out" to Ellsworth, Kallas, Talboy & DeFranco. (R., p.66.) 
Attorney John DeFranco filed a petition for post-conviction relief on behalf of Leer 
on October 2,2007, more than seventeen months after the Remittitur issued. 
As recently noted by the ldaho Court of Appeals in Person, ldaho courts 
recognize equitable tolling in only two situations: "where the petitioner was 
incarcerated in an out-of-state facility on an in-state conviction without legal 
representation or access to ldaho legal materials and where mental disease 
and/or psychotropic medication renders a petitioner incompetent and prevents 
petitioner from earlier pursuing challenges to his conviction." --- P.3d ----, 2009 
WL 918519 * I  (citing Savas v. State, 139 ldaho 957, 960, 88 P.3d 776, 779 (Ct. 
App. 2003); lsaak v. State, 132 ldaho 369, 370 n. 1, 972 P.2d 1097, 1098 n. 1 
(Ct. App. 1999)). In determining Leer was entitled to equitable tolling, the district 
court did not cite either of these situations. Rather, the court stated: 
Well, it seems like under the circumstances there should be some 
equitable tolling of the statute of limitations because there was 
something that happened that was outside of his control. 
Apparently, there was an attempt by Mr. Leer during the one-year 
statutory period to pursue his post-conviction relief filing, and that 
was eventually done for him. But by virtue of the fact that his court- 
appointed attorney didn't get notice until after the expiration of the 
statutory period, he didn't file it. I mean, he didn't file the actual 
petition for post-conviction relief. 
Under the unique circumstances of this case, I think that it 
would be inequitable to summarily dismiss the case on a statute of 
limitations basis. If Mr. Leer had sat on his rights and not pursued 
his petition for post-conviction relief at all until after the one-year 
statutory period had cut off his right to file the petition, then it would 
be a different story and I probably would look more favorably upon 
the state's motion to dismiss strictly on that ground. 
But under the circumstances of this case, I do not find that 
the defendant -- or rather the petitioner, requested counsel, counsel 
was appointed well within the statutory period. However, 
unfortunately, because of apparently the need of a conflict attorney 
to be appointed from the Public Defender's Office, Mr. DeFranco 
was not notified that he would be the appointed counsel until after 
the statutory period had expired. 
Leer's timely request for counsel does not, however, constitute a 
recognized basis for equitable tolling, nor should it. Although Leer believed he 
needed assistance in pursuing post-conviction relief, there is no reason he could 
not have accompanied his Motion for Counsel with an actual petition in order to 
preserve his rights. Indeed, Lehtinen advised him of the option of filing a post- 
conviction petition in his 2006 Letter, well before the statute of limitation expired 
(R., pp.46-47.) Moreover, filing a post-conviction petition would have been no 
more rigorous or complex than the Motion for Counsel Leer filed in lieu of a 
petition. 
Although Leer does not directly address the statute of limitation or tolling 
as an issue on appeal (likely because the district court ruled in his favor on this 
point), it appears Leer may assert tolling was appropriate under the second 
situation, i.e., "where mental disease andlor psychotropic medication renders a 
petitioner incompetent and prevents petitioner from earlier pursuing challenges to 
his conviction." Person, --- P.3d ----, 2009 WL 918519 * I . ~  Specifically, in his 
statement of the facts, Leer notes his explanation in his Motion for Counsel that 
he needed counsel because "he had suffered an injury while at the prison which 
had resulted in significant brain injury and diminished mental capacity making 
self-representation impossible," and the "scope" of his "brain injury," which he 
believes "became evident" when the "following [colloquy] transpired" at the 
evidentiary hearing: 
THE COURT: Mr. Leer, what are you taking? The reason I'm 
asking this is - for the record, I'm observing, your demeanor here in 
the courtroom today, and you appear to be confused. Are you 
confused? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. But I'm okay. Okay? That's just from 
my head. 
THE COURT: Have you suffered a - - not an injury, but didn't you 
suffer some sort of a medical emergency while you've been 
incarcerated? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah 
THE COURT: What happened? 
It does not appear the first situation would apply to Leer - "where the petitioner 
was incarcerated in an out-of-state facility on an in-state conviction without legal 
representation or access to ldaho legal materials" - since there is no indication in 
the record Leer was incarcerated during the relevant time period anywhere other 
than the ldaho State Correctional Institution. 
THE DEFENDANT: I don't know for sure, but they said I was 
playing racquetball and something happened to me. And they said 
I was going to die, and they cut my head open from here 
somewhere and back here and took some brain out. And that's 
why sometimes I don't -- I don't -- sometimes when I'm not -- 
MR. DEFRANCO: It's okay, Bill. Take your time. 
THE DEFENDANT: Sometimes it's hard for me to remember 
things and concentrate, and I get nervous and stuff when I don't 
know for sure what -- yeah, okay. 
THE COURT: Mr. Leer, we're going to take our time today. We 
don't have any other pressing business at all today. It's just you 
and your attorney, Mr. DeFranco here, and the prosecuting attorney 
and the court staff. 
And the purpose of this hearing today is to see whether or 
not your lawyer, Mr. DeFranco, is able to convince me as the judge 
that your attorney here, the gentleman who is on the witness stand, 
had failed to represent you properly on the appeal. Do you 
understand? 
THE DEFENDANT: Okay. I've been reading that a lot. 
(Opening Brief of Appellant, pp.2, 4-5 (quoting 5/1/08 Tr. 5/1/08, p.9, L.2 - p.10, 
L.13).) 
While Leer may have appeared to the district court to be confused at the 
evidentiary hearing, this exchange does not establish Leer is or was incompetent 
nor does it establish any mental disease or psychotropic medication prevented 
him "from earlier pursuing challenges to his conviction." Person, supra. To the 
contrary, as previously noted, while Leer desired assistance in pursuing post- 
conviction relief, his Motion for Counsel, which is articulate and supported by 
authority, is strong evidence Leer's mental status did not prevent him from 
pursuing post-conviction relief in a timely manner. As explained in Chico- 
Rodriquez v. State, 141 Idaho 579, 582, 114 P.3d 137, 140 (Ct. App. 2005): 
m h e  bar for equitable tolling for post-conviction actions is 
high. It is not enough to show that compliance was simply made 
more difficult on account of a mental condition. We hold that in 
order for the statute of limitation under the UPCPA to be tolled 
on account of a mental illness, an unrepresented petitioner 
must show that he suffered from a serious mental illness 
which rendered him incompetent to understand his legal right 
to bring an action within a year or otherwise rendered him 
incapable of taking necessary steps to pursue that right. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Even if this Court were to conclude Leer's head injury was the equivalent 
of a "mental disease" that may have entitled him to tolling for some period of time 
during the limitations period, he simply failed to establish any facts that would 
entitle him to tolling on this basis.5 Instead, Leer's response to the state's 
timeliness argument Focused on the fact that it would have been "impossible" for 
conflict counsel "to file a timely petition" since the case was not sent to conflict 
counsel's "firm until July 18, 2007," and Leer's assertion that his Motion for 
Even if Leer's head injury could be a basis for tolling, there is no evidence in the 
record how long the statute would have been tolled as a result. That Leer may 
have been hospitalized for a period of time does not mean he is entitled to toll the 
limitation period indefinitely or up to the date his petition was eventually filed. 
Rather, tolling is awarded only for a certain specified period of time. Chico- 
Rodriauez, 141 ldaho at 582, 114 P.3d at 140 ("Equitable tolling will apply only 
during the period in which the petitioner's mental illness actually prevented him 
from filing a post-conviction action; any period following conviction during which 
the petitioner fails to meet the equitable tolling criteria will count toward the 
limitation period."). Thus, for example, if this Court decided Leer was entitled to 
toll the statute of limitation for the period he was hospitalized, and that period 
was 30 days, the deadline for filing his petition would only be extended by 30 
days, not the more than five months it actually took to file the petition. Moreover, 
it is clear from Leer's Motion for Counsel that his head injury did not "render[ ] 
him incompetent to understand his legal right to bring an action within a year or 
otherwise render[] him incapable of taking necessary steps to pursue that right." 
Chico-Rodriquez, 141 ldaho at 582, 114 P.3d at 140. To the contrary, Leer's 
motion demonstrates exactly the opposite, i.e., that he understood his right to file 
a post-conviction petition and was sufficiently competent to prepare and file a 
pleading in the appropriate court. 
Counsel "should be deemed a petition." (R., p.64.) Conflict post-conviction 
counsel's receipt of the case is irrelevant to tolling because the statute of 
limitation had already expired at that point. See, e.g., Ferauson v. Palmateer, 
321 F.3d 820, 821 (9th Cir. 2003) (cannot revive a statute of limitation period 
once it has expired); Curtiss v. Mount Pleasant Correctional Facility, 338 F.3d 
851, 855 (8th Cir. 2003) (same). 
As for Leer's claim that his Motion for Counsel should be "deemed a 
petition," the ldaho Court of Appeals recently rejected a similar argument in 
Schwartz v. State, 145 ldaho 186, 177 P.3d 400 (Ct. App. 2008). Schwartz had 
until December 30, 2003, to file her petition for post-conviction relief. @ at 190, 
177 P.3d at 404. On September 12, 2003, Schwartz sent a letter to the district 
court seeking the assistance of counsel to prepare her petition. @ at 188, 177 
P.3d at 402. The court appointed counsel on October 8, 2003. Id. However, 
neither counsel nor Schwartz filed a petition before the December 30, 2003 
deadline. @ 
On appeal, Schwartz claimed, inter alia, that her September 12, 2003 
letter requesting counsel "was an application in substance because it set forth 
claims for post-conviction relief and contained many other components of an 
application as required by I.C. § 19-4903." Schwartz, 145 ldaho at 190, 177 P.3d 
at 404. In rejecting Schwartz's request, the Court of Appeals noted the ldaho 
Supreme Court's holding in State v. Jakoski, 139 ldaho 352, 355, 79 P.3d 711, 
714 (2003), "that it would be too great a stretch for a motion filed in a criminal 
case to be considered a pleading commencing civil litigation" even where the 
motion contains claims "that are typically brought in post-conviction proceedings." 
Id. The Court of Appeals concluded "the letter's substance did not provide a 
sufficient basis for th[e] Court to treat the letter as Schwartz's application," given 
neither Schwartz nor her attorney "object[ed] when the district court failed to 
open a separate civil case after receiving the letter" or "considered the letter to 
have been an application for post-conviction relief," and given that, in the letter, 
Schwartz also asserted "she did not understand her guilty plea, which appears to 
be a basis to request to have her guilty plea withdrawn pursuant to I.C.R. 33." Id. 
at 190-91, 177 P.3d at 404-05. 
As in Schwartz (and Jakoski), "it would be too great a stretch" to consider 
Leer's Motion for Counsel, which was filed in Leer's criminal case, "to be 
considered a pleading commencing civil litigation." This is particularly true 
where, as here, the Motion for Counsel fails to remotely resemble a post- 
conviction petition. Indeed, Leer's Motion for Counsel does not even contain any 
claims - the claims can only be assumed by reference to the attachments. 
Moreover, the, motion contains no verification or any facts alleged and "sworn to 
affirmatively as true and correct" as required by I.C. § 19-4902(a), and Leer's 
Motion for Counsel fails to comply with any of the requirements of I.C. § 19-4903. 
This Court should therefore conclude, as it did in Schwartz, that there is no 
"sufficient basis" to treat Leer's Motion for Counsel as a petition for post- 
conviction relief. See also Savas v. State, 139 Idaho 957, 88 P.3d 776 (Ct. App. 
2003) (declining to treat Sayas' letter to the court indicating he needed 
assistance to complete a post-conviction petition as a petition). 
Because Leer's Motion for Counsel cannot be considered a petition for 
post-conviction relief, and because Leer's actual petition was untimely, and he 
failed to establish he was entitled to tolling of the statute of limitation, this Court 
should affirm the district court's denial of post-conviction relief. See, e.g., 
McKinnev v. State, 133 ldaho 695, 700, 992 P.2d 144, 149 (1999); State v. 
m r ,  129 ldaho 700, 704, 931 P.2d 1218, 1222 (1997) (where the lower court 
reaches the correct result by a different theory, the appellate court will affirm the 
order on the correct theory). 
11. 
The District Court Correctlv Concluded Leer Was Not Entitled To Post-Conviction 
Relief Because Leer Failed To Establish Ineffective Assistance Of Appellate 
Counsel 
A. Introduction 
Leer asserts the district court erred in denying his petition for post- 
conviction relief because, he contends, he met his burden of establishing 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel as a result of counsel's failure to 
challenge the suppression issue on appeal. (Opening Brief of Appellant, pp.8- 
27.) Leer alternatively argues appellate counsel was ineffective when "counsel 
vitiated [Leer's] plea agreement by denying him the bargained for benefit of 
appellate review of his suppression motion." (Opening Brief of Appellant, pp.28- 
32.) Leer's arguments fail. Leer failed to establish Lehtinen was deficient for 
failing to raise an issue he believed would be "clearly unsuccessful," and Leer 
failed to establish he was prejudiced by Lehtinen's failure to do so. The district 
court therefore correctly concluded Leer was not entitled to relief. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Where the district court conducts a hearing and enters findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, an appellate court will disturb the findings of fact only if they 
are clearly erroneous, but will freely review the conclusions of law drawn by the 
district court from those facts. Mitchell v. State, 132 ldaho 274, 276-77, 971 P.2d 
727, 729-730 (1998); Gabourie v. State, 125 ldaho 254, 869 P.2d 571 (Ct. App. 
1994). A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel presents mixed questions of 
law and fact. A petitioner for post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by 
a preponderance of the evidence, the allegations on which his claim is based. 
ldaho Criminal Rule 57(c); Estes v. State, 11 1 ldaho 430, 436, 725 P.2d 135, 141 
(1 986). A trial court's decision that the petitioner has not met his burden of proof 
is entitled to great weight. Sanders v. State, 117 ldaho 939, 940, 792 P.2d 964, 
965 (Ct. App. 1990). Furthermore, the credibility of the witnesses and the weight 
to be given to the testimony are matters within the discretion of the trial court. 
Rueth v. State, 103 ldaho 74, 644 P.2d 1333 (1982). 
C. General Legal Standards Applicable To Ineffective Assistance Of 
Appellate Counsel Claims 
It is well-settled that in order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel. 
a petitioner must provide admissible evidence that his counsel's performance 
was deficient and that the alleged deficiency resulted in prejudice. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Richman v. State, 138 ldaho 190, 
192, 59 P.3d 995, 997 (Ct. App. 2002) ("To prevail on an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim, the defendant must show that the attorney's performance was 
deficient, and that the defendant was prejudiced by the deficiency." (citations 
omitted)). To establish deficient performance, the petitioner must demonstrate 
counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, 
Gibson v. State, 110 ldaho 631, 634, 718 P.2d 283, 286 (1986), and overcome 
the "strong presumption that counsel's performance was within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance." Davis v. State, 116 ldaho 401, 406, 775 
P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989). 
To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show a reasonable probability 
that, but for trial counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding 
would have been different. Ara~on v. State, 114 ldaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d 1174, 
1177 (1988); Cowaer v. State, 132 ldaho 681, 685, 978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 
1999); Roman v. State, 125 ldaho 644,649,873 P.2d 898,903 (Ct. App. 1994). 
The foregoing standards apply to claims of ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985); Mitchell v. State, 132 
ldaho 274, 276, 971 P.2d 727, 730 (1998). The relevant inquiry on the prejudice 
prong is whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, 
Leer would have prevailed on appeal. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 
(2000). 
D. Leer Has Failed To Establish Appellate Counsel Was Ineffective For 
Failing To Challenae The Suppression Issue On Appeal 
Leer contends Lehtinen's performance on appeal was deficient "because 
he failed to argue the meritorious suppression issue," and that he was prejudiced 
as a result because, he contends, "it is reasonably probable that, had counsel 
argued the suppression issue, [Leer] would have prevailed and the case against 
him ultimately would have been dismissed for lack of admissible evidence." 
(Opening Brief of Appellant, p.8.) The district court correctly concluded Leer 
failed to establish either deficient performance or resulting prejudice. 
1. Leer Failed To Establish Lehtinen's Performance Was Deficient 
On direct appeal, Lehtinen raised a single issue on behalf of Leer - 
excessive sentence. (#31559, Appellant's Brief.) Lehtinen advised Leer of his 
decision to raise only this issue, and not include the suppression issue, in a letter 
dated October 26, 2005 ("2005 Letter"), explaining: 
After reviewing the transcript of your suppression hearing, I 
concluded that there are no valid suppression issues to have raised 
on appeal. Here is a brief summary of my analysis: 
0 The initial "stop" was valid because the officers' mistake of 
fact as to your identity nevertheless provided them with a 
'reasonable articulable suspicion' to warrant your temporary 
detention to determine your identity. 
The continued detention, even after learning your true 
identity, was valid because the "collective knowledge 
doctrine" says that if other officers have knowledge of facts 
to justify an investigative detention that is sufficient even if 
the officer who actually does the detaining does not know 
why she is doing so. Furthermore, based on Detective 
Loveland's testimony, she clearly had a reasonable 
articulable suspicion warranting a temporary investigative 
detention. 
0 The first drug dog's alert provided the police with probable 
cause to search the car. So there's nothing on that one. 
The patdown of the jacket was valid for officer safety 
reasons. While Officer Lister's opening of the mesh bag was 
probably illegal, I think the district court correctly concluded 
that, given the dog's alert on the car, the contents of the bag 
would inevitably have been discovered (thus curing any taint 
arising from the illegal search). 
If you want to discuss any part of my analysis in further detail, 
please feel free to call me. 
Although there is probably little hope of success, I went 
ahead and prepared a brief challenging your sentence. (A copy of 
that brief is enclosed for your review.) I don't recall if we have ever 
discussed it, but in my experience "excessive sentence" claims, no 
matter how strong they appear, have virtually no chance of success 
in our Court of Appeals. 
(State's Exhibit 1 .) 
Lehtinen adhered to this opinion in his 2006 Letter ( R  p.47 
("Unfortunately for you, I stand by my assessment (outlined in my October 26, 
2005 letter to you) that the suppression issue would not have been viable on 
appeal")), and at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing (511108 Tr., p.21, L.9 - 
p.24, L.8, p.39, Ls.14-17, p.41, Ls.5-10). Specifically, Lehtinen testified: 
Q: All right. Is it fair, then, to say, Mr. Lehtinen that whatever 
attacks you might have raised, you were convinced, were so 
clearly, would be so clearly unsuccessful that you couldn't in good 
conscience raise them in the appellant court? 
A: That was my opinion. 
(511 1/08 Tr., p.41, Ls.5-10.) 
On appeal, Leer argues Lehtinen's failure to pursue the suppression issue 
was deficient, claiming "a suppression issue generally has a better chance of 
success on appeal than an argument that the district court abused its discretion 
by imposing excessive sentences." (Opening Brief of Appellant, pp.10-11.) 
Leer's belief that the suppression issue was the "best argument to be made" 
when compared to the issue actually raised (excessive sentence) falls woefully 
short of establishing deficient performance. 
"An indigent defendant does not have a constitutional right to compel 
appointed appellate counsel to press all nonfrivolous arguments that the 
defendant wishes to pursue." Mintun v. State, 144 ldaho 656, 661, 168 P.3d 40, 
45 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983)). "Rather, 
appellate counsel must make a conscientious examination of the case and file a 
brief in support of the best arguments to be made." LaBelle v. State, 130 ldaho 
115, 119, 937 P.2d 427, 431 (Ct. App. 1997). Indeed, as noted by the United 
States Supreme Court in Jones: 
Neither Anders [v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),] nor any other 
decision of this Court suggests, however, that the indigent 
defendant has a constitutional right to compel appointed counsel to 
press nonfrivolous points requested by the client, if counsel, as a 
matter of professional judgment, decides not to present those 
points. 
jones, 463 U.S. at 751 (cited with approval in LaBelle, 130 ldaho at 119, 937 
Although it is "possible to bring a Strickland claim based on counsel's 
failure to raise a particular claim, . . . it is difficult to demonstrate that counsel was 
incompetent." m, 144 ldaho at 661, 168 P.3d at 45 (quoting Smith v. 
Robbins, 528 US. 259, 288 (2000)). "[Olnly when ignored issues are clearly 
stronger than those presented, will the presumption of effective assistance of 
counsel be overcome." (alteration original, emphasis added) 
Leer has failed to establish the suppression issue Lehtinen elected not to 
pursue was "clearly stronger" than the issue presented such that Lehtinen's 
decision was objectively unreasonable. Leer merely states, in a conclusory 
fashion, that it "was the best argument to be made," and notes the district court's 
indication "that the suppression motion was very complicated" and the court 
"expected to have it reviewed on appeal." (Opening Brief of Appellant, p.11.) 
However, neither Leer's belief, nor the district court's expectation establish the 
suppression issue was "clearly stronger" than the issue presented so as to 
render the decision of what issue to raise objectively unreasonable. Lehtinen, 
after researching the relevant law, and making "the mandatory, conscientious 
examination of the record," LaBelle, supra, concluded, "as a matter of 
professional judgment," Jones, supra, that the suppression issue would not 
succeed on appeal and he felt he could not in "good conscience" raise the issue 
(5/1/08 Tr., p.41, Ls.5-10). Lehtinen, therefore, instead elected to only challenge 
Leer's sentence. (2005 Letter (Exhibit I).) That sentencing "challenges are 
rarely successful," does not make every other potential issue "clearly stronger" 
(Opening Brief of Appellant, p.10), such that it is always deficient performance to 
only challenge the reasonableness of a sentence. Having deemed the 
suppression issue one that would be "clearly unsuccessful" on appeal, Lehtinen 
did not perform deficiently by instead challenging Leer's sentence despite his 
recognition Leer would not likely prevail on that claim either. & Mitchell v. 
State, 132 Idaho 274, 278-79, 971 P.2d 727, 731-32 (1998) (finding no 
presumption of prejudice where appellate counsel raised "one non-frivolous 
issue, the claim of an excessive sentence"). 
Because Lehtinen's decision was based upon a conscientious 
examination of the record, and was not the result of inadequate preparation, 
ignorance of the relevant law, or any other shortcoming capable of objective 
review, Leer has failed to establish Lehtinen's performance was deficient. & 
Giles v. State, 125 ldaho 921, 924, 877 P.2d 365, 368 ($994); Cunninqham v. 
m, 117 ldaho 428,430-31, 788 P.2d 243, 245-46 (Ct. App. 1990), 
2. Leer Failed To Establish He Was Prejudiced Bv Lehtinen's Failure 
To Challenqe The Suppression Issue On Appeal 
Leer argues he was prejudiced by Lehtinen's failure to pursue the 
suppression issue on appeal because, he asserts, "[hlad [Lehtinen] elected to 
raise the suppression issue on appeal, the order of the District Court likely would 
have been reversed because the detention of William violated the 4'h 
Amendment of the United States Constitution as well as Art. I, 3 17 of the ldaho 
Constitution." (Opening Brief of ~ ~ p e l l a n t ,  p.18.) Because the district court 
correctly denied Leer's motion to suppress, Leer cannot meet his burden of 
establishing prejudice in relation to Lehtinen's failure to raise the suppression 
issue on appeal. 
Leer filed a motion to suppress "any and all evidence seized from the 
vehicle" he was driving preceding his arrest. (#31559 R., p.32.) The court 
conducted an evidentiary hearing after which it issued a written opinion including 
the following factual findings: 
[Leer] was one of the subjects of an investigation by the Ada 
County Sheriffs Office on suspicion of dealing methamphetamine, 
marijuana, cocaine, and weapons. On April 21, 2004, Detectives 
Nicole Loveland and Javier Bustos were in the midst of the 
investigation. They had a man named Darren Parton under 
su~eillance. The detectives had information from several sources 
that Parton had been delivering methamphetamine for the 
defendant (Leer). On April 13 and again on April 16, 2004, an 
informant named Steven Wolf had told detectives that Leer was 
staying at a Shilo Inn in Boise and that Leer had several ounces of 
methamphetamine and guns in the room. Wolf said he worked for 
Leer distributing drugs. On April 19, 2004, detectives saw Parton's 
red Subaru parked at Leer's residence in Boise. The room Leer 
was renting at the Shilo inn was registered to Parton's girlfriend, 
Martha Maxwell. 
On April 21, 2004, Detectives Loveland and Bustos were 
watching, from some distance, Parton's red Subaru while it was 
parked at the Shilo Inn. They saw the vehicle leave the parking lot 
but they were too far away to identify either the driver or the 
passenger. They could only tell that a male was driving and a 
female was in the passenger seat. They followed the Subaru from 
a distance so they would not arouse the occupants' suspicion. 
They followed it to a McDonald's restaurant on 25'h and Fairview. 
They summoned other officers to the scene, including Detective 
Joe Wright and a uniformed patrol officer, Kristine England. 
Detectives Loveland and Bustos returned to the Shilo Inn. They 
stayed in communication with Detective Wright and a supervisor, 
Sergeant Mike Rowe, by cellular telephone. 
Based on their belief that the man in the driver's seat of 
Parton's Subaru was Parton himself, and knowing that there was 
an outstanding warrant for Parton's arrest, Detective Loveland 
informed Sergeant Rowe, who in turn asked dispatch to have an 
officer make contact with the man sitting in the driver's seat of the 
now parked Subaru. 
The car was parked in a marked parking stall facing a curb. 
Officer England parked her marked police car slightly behind and to 
the right of the Subaru, in such a way that it would have been 
"extremely difficult" for the Subaru to back out of the parking space. 
The dispatch log revealed that Officer England informed her 
dispatcher that she was going to check on the driver at 12:39 p.m. 
She asked the driver for his driver's license and contacted dispatch 
at 12:40 with the information that the driver was William Glen Leer. 
This information was communicated to Detectives Loveland and 
Bustos. Officer England verified there were no warrants 
outstanding for Leer. Officer England was told by Detectives 
Loveland and Bustos that she should detain or hold Leer because 
other officers were on their way and wanted to talk with him. 
Officer England retained possession of Leer's driver's license and 
asked him to wait. Another police officer, Jerry Lister, had arrived 
on the scene and was standing behind the Subaru with Officer 
England while Leer and his passenger remained in the Subaru. 
Detective Bustos telephoned Glenda Rebbe, a Probation 
officer and certified drug detection dog handler, who arrived on the 
scene with her drug dog within ten to fifteen minutes. Detective 
Wright asked her to take the dog around the outside of the car. 
Officer England had Leer and his passenger get out of the car while 
Rebbe and the dog worked. The dog alerted three times to the 
presence of drugs in the Subaru. Rebbe testified at the 
suppression hearing that she, as a probation and parole officer, 
was not allowed to have the police conduct a probable cause 
search (a warrantless search) based on her dog's positive alert for 
the presence of drugs. Therefore, the police did not rely on 
Rebbe's dog's alert. Instead the police contacted another K-9 
handler, Deputy Steve Russell. 
Before Deputy Russell's arrival and fifteen minutes since the 
initial contact by England, England asked Leer if he wanted his 
jacket and he responded that he did. England then reached in the 
open window of the car and pulled out Leer's jacket. She searched 
the jacket for weapons and found money in a pocket as well as a 
small bag. She gave the bag to Officer Jerry Lister to search. 
Lister discovered needles, plastic bags and a white, powdery 
substance. Lister then told Leer he was under arrest for drug 
paraphernalia. Leer ran from the officers, who caught him after a 
short chase. The officers then searched Leer and arrested him. 
After Leer's arrest, Officer Russell arrived at the scene at 
approximately 1:30-1:35. His dog also alerted on the Subaru for 
the presence of drugs. This positive alert was what the police 
relied on for probable cause to justify a warrantless search of the 
vehicle. As a result of that search, numerous controlled substances 
were found in the trunk, including several pounds of 
methamphetamine and marijuana, close to a pound of cocaine, and 
a handgun. 
(#31559 R., pp.44-47.) 
Based on these facts, the district court concluded Leer was not entitled to 
suppression because law enforcement had reasonable articulabie suspicion to 
believe Leer was engaged in drug trafficking and the scope of the detention was 
reasonable to confirm or dispel that suspicion. (#31559 R., pp.47-53.) With 
respect to the search of Leer's coat, the district court determined the officers 
were entitled to check Leer's coat for weapons before giving it to him, but that 
"the manner in which the search of the coat was conducted violated Leer's 
expectation of privacy" since the officer did not first "squeeze" the bag that was 
removed from Leer's coat or "notice a weapon's profile" before opening the bag. 
(#31559 R., pp.53-54.) The court nevertheless found the evidence in the bag 
would ultimately have been discovered given that there was probable cause to 
search the car and arrest Leer as a result of the drugs found during that search. 
(#31559 R., pp.54-55.) 
Leer argues the district court's ruling was erroneous and therefore would 
have been reversed if the issue had been raised on appeal. (Opening Brief of 
Appellant, pp.18-27.) Specifically, Leer contends, "While the police did have the 
information from Wolfe [sic] and possibly Stevens accusing [Leer] of giving them 
drugs to deliver, that information was not sufficient to establish a reasonable and 
articulable suspicion of criminal activity by [Leer]" because, Leer asserts, the 
information provided by Wolf and Stevens lacked adequate indicia of reliability. 
(Opening Brief of Appellant, pp.23-27.) Leer's reliance on this perceived flaw is 
, misplaced because the alleged lack of reliability in the information provided by 
Wolf and Stevens was not the basis upon which Leer sought suppression. 
Leer's suppression motion only vaguely asserted "the stop and search of 
the vehicle was unreasonable under the 4th, and 14'~ amendments to the United 
States Constitution and Article 1, Sections 1 and 17 of the tdaho State 
Constitution." (#31559 R., p.32.) The brief Leer submitted after the evidentiary 
hearing in support of the motion contended (1) the detention and search were 
unsupported by probable cause or exigent circumstances, and (2) there was no 
reasonable articulable suspicion to extend the stop after "Leer produced his valid 
identification and it was learned there was not [sic] outstanding warrant for him" 
since "Officer England did not suspect, much less have probable cause of, any 
criminal activity." (#31559 R., Brief in Support of Motion to Suppress Evidence 
(Augmentation).) Nowhere in either his motion or his brief did Leer assert the 
evidence should have been suppressed because the information upon which the 
officers were basing their reasonable articulable suspicion was unreliable. 
Consequently, Lehtinen could not have challenged the detention on this basis for 
the first time on appeaL6 Sanchez v. Arave, 120 ldaho 321,322, 815 P.2d 3061, 
1062 (1991) (generally issues not raised below may not be considered for the 
first time on appeal). Hutchinson v. Commonwealth, 2005 WL 2174058 *5 (Ky. 
App. 2005) (declining to consider "contention that the officers failed to provide an 
indicia of reliability of the confidential informant" since the trial court did not "hear 
or rule on the merits" of the contention); Cook v. State, 574 So.2d 905, 907 (Ala. 
Cr. App. 1990) ("The issue of the reliability of the informant was not raised in any 
The state acknowledges "the government carries the burden of proving that the 
search or seizure in question was reasonable." State v. Bisho~, 203 P.3d 1203 
(2009) (citing State v. Anderson, 140 ldaho 484, 486, 95 P.3d 635, 637 (2004)). 
The state is, however, unaware of any authority which requires the state, in an 
effort to meet its burden, to affirmatively address all potential challenges to the 
information which serves as the basis for law enforcement's reasonable 
articulable suspicion or probable cause determination regardless of whether that 
basis is asserted by the defendant. If a defendant wants to challenge an 
informant's reliability, as Leer does for the first time in this appeal, he should be 
required to do so first in the district court where the state has the opportunity to 
respond to specific allegations such as "the location of the informant" and 
"whether the [informants] remained in state custody or whether they had bonded 
out, and if so, whether they could be located again." (Opening Brief of Appellant, 
p.24.) 
manner at trial and cannot be presented for the first time on appeal.") (citations 
omitted). 
Even if this Court concludes the reliability of the information upon which 
law enforcement was relying was raised to or implicitly considered by the district 
court in evaluating whether the state met its burden of proving Leer's detention 
was reasonable, Leer's claim that the information was unreliable fails. The 
United States Supreme Court first addressed a similar issue in Adams v. 
Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972), which involved an investigatory detention of 
Williams after "a person known" to Sergeant John Connolly told him Williams was 
"seated in a nearby vehicle" and "was carrying narcotics and had a gun at his 
waist." Id. at 144. Sergeant Connolly thereafter approached Williams' vehicle, 
tapped on the window, and asked Williams to open the door. Id. at 145. 
Williams instead rolled down the window at which time "the sergeant reached into 
the car and removed a fully loaded revolver from Williams' waistband." Id. "The 
gun had not been visible to Connolly from outside the car, but it was in precisely 
the place indicated by the informant." Id. Sergeant Connolly arrested Williams 
for unlawful possession of a firearm and possession of heroin which was 
discovered in a search incident to arrest. Id. 
On appeal, Williams argued "that absent a more reliable informant, or 
some corroboration of the tip, the policeman's actions were unreasonable under 
the standards set forth in" Terrv v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Williams, 407 U.S. at 
145. Applying the principles in Tern/, the Court rejected Williams' argument, 
reasoning: 
[W]e believe that Sgt. Connolly acted justifiably in responding to his 
informant's tip. The informant was known to him personally and 
had provided him with information in the past. This is a stronger 
case than obtains in the case of an anonymous telephone tip. The 
informant here came forward personally to give information that 
was immediately verifiable at the scene. . . . Thus, while the Court's 
decisions indicate that this informant's unverified tip may have been 
insufficient for a narcotics arrest or search warrant, the information 
carried enough indicia of reliability to justify the officer's forcible 
stop of Williams. 
In reaching this conclusion, we reject [Williams'] argument 
that reasonable cause for a stop and frisk can only be based on the 
officer's personal observation, rather than on information supplied 
by another person. Informants' tips, like all other clues and 
evidence coming to a policeman on the scene, may vary greatly in 
their value and reliability. One simple rule will not cover every 
situation. Some tips, completely lacking in indicia of reliability, 
would either warrant no police response or require further 
investigation before a forcible stop of a suspect would be 
authorized. But in some situations - for example, when the victim 
of a street crime seeks immediate police aid and gives a description 
of his assailant, or when a credible informant warns of a specific 
impending crime - the subtleties of the hearsay rule should not 
thwart an appropriate police response. 
Williams, 407 U.S. at 146-47 (citations and footnote omitted) 
The United States Supreme Court expanded upon the reliability 
requirements when law enforcement detains someone based on an anonymous 
informant's tip in Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990). The Court noted the 
"informant's veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge" are "relevant in the 
reasonable suspicion context," but cautioned that "allowance must be made in 
applying them" to the "showing required to meet that standard." Id. at 328 
(quotations and citations omitted). The Court explained the Tern/ standard as 
follows: 
Th[ej level of suspicion [required for a Terry stop] is considerably 
less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence. 
We have held that probable cause means a fair probability that 
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found, and the level of 
suspicion required for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding 
than for probable cause. 
Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than 
probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can 
be established with information that is different in quantity or 
content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in 
the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that 
is less reliable than that required to show probable cause. . . . 
Reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is dependent upon both 
the content of information possessed by police and its degree of 
reliability. Both factors - quantity and quality - are considered in 
the totality of the circumstances - the whole picture, that must be 
taken into account when evaluating whether there is reasonable 
suspicion. Thus, if a tip has a relatively low degree of reliability, 
more information will be required to establish the requisite quantum 
of suspicion than would be required if the tip were more reliable. 
The ~ a f e s [ ~  Court applied its totality-of-the-circumstances 
approach in this manner, taking into account the facts known to the 
officers from personal observation, and giving the anonymous tip 
the weight it deserved in light of its indicia of reliability as 
established through independent police work. The same approach 
applies in the reasonable-suspicion context, the only difference 
being the level of suspicion that must be established. 
White, 496 U.S. at 330-31 (quotations and citations omitted). 
Consistent with Williams and White, the ldaho Supreme Court has stated: 
An informant's tip regarding suspected criminal activity may 
give raise to reasonable suspicion when it would warrant a man of 
reasonable caution in the belief that a stop was appropriate. 
Whether a tip amounts to reasonable suspicion depends on the 
totality of the circumstances including the substance, source, and 
reliability of the information provided. In other words, a tip must 
possess adequate indicia of reliability in order to justify a Terry 
stop. The more reliable the tip, the less information required to 
establish reasonable suspicion. 
State v. Bishop, 203 P.3d 1203, 1210-11 (2009) (citing White and Williams, 
supra) (quotations omitted). The Idaho Supreme Court identified the following 
7111inois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), 
factors as indicative of reliability: (1) "whether the informant reveals his or her 
identity and the basis of his or her knowledge;" (2) "whether the location of the 
informant is known;" (3) "whether the information was based on first-hand 
obse~ations of events as they were occurring;" (4) "whether the information . . . 
provided was subject to immediate confirmation or corroboration by police;" (5) 
"whether the informant has previously provided reliable information;" and (6) 
"whether the informant could be held criminally liable if the report were 
discovered to be false." Id. at 121 1. 
The ldaho Supreme Court has further stated that when "a tip is received 
from a known citizen-informant, the tip is generally sufficient to establish 
reasonable suspicion," although "the content of the tip and the informant's basis 
of knowledge are still relevant." Bishop, 203 P.3d at 1211. However, when the 
known citizen-informant is a member of the "criminal milieu," "more information 
may be necessary." State v. Chapman, 146 Idaho 346, -, 194 P.3d 550, 555 
(Ct. App. 2008). "[Flurther evidence of veracity and reliability may be provided by 
the informant's acknowledgement that he or she has participated in criminal 
activity." Dunlap v. State, 126 ldaho 901, 907, 894 P.2d 134, 140 (Ct. App. 
1995). Additionally, information based upon personal observation is "one of the 
strongest possible indications of a basis of knowledge." State v. Varqovich, 113 
ldaho 354, 356, 743 P.2d 1007, 1009 (Ct. App. 1987) (citing W. RINGEL, 
SEARCHES & SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS 5 4.3(a)(l) (2d ed. 
1987)). 
Applying the foregoing principles to the facts of this case demonstrates the 
information provided by Wolf and Stevens, as well as the confidential informant, 
was sufficiently reliable to provide reasonable articulable suspicion to detain 
Leer, particularly when coupled with the corroborative investigation conducted by 
law enforcement. Detective Loveland testified that on April 13, 2004, Wolf "was 
arrested with well over an ounce of methamphetamine in his vehicle," and told 
them he was "working" for "Billy" Leer, "delivering ounces and getting 
methamphetamine, and getting payment in ounces of methamphetamine for 
doing that." (#31559, Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.93, Ls. 15-1 7, p.94, Ls. 12-1 5, p.104, Ls.2- 
20.) Wolf also told law enforcement Leer was currently staying in Room 343 at 
the Shilo Inn and that Leer "haid] several ounces of meth in the room as well as 
money and guns." (#31559, Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.94, Ls.16-19, p.108, Ls.4-25.) 
Three days later, on April 16, 2004, "Wolf was arrested again with Richard 
Stevens, and they had well over an ounce of methamphetamine again as well as 
approximately 3 ounces of marij~ana."~ (#31559, Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.96, Ls.15-18.) 
Following that arrest, Wolf indicated Leer was still at the Shilo Inn and "had 
several ounces of methamphetamine in the room as well as a bagful of guns" 
and "that him and Richard Stevens had received 6 ounces to deliver and also in 
payment." (#31559, Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.97, L.22 - p.98, L.1.) Stevens indicated 
Leer "was dealing out of motel rooms" "most of the time" and Wolf confirmed 
Leer was currently doing so out of Room 343 at the Shilo Inn. (#31559, Supp. 
Hrg. Tr., p.108, Ls.9-25.) 
Wolf bonded out on his April 13 arrest on April 14, 2004. (#31559, Supp. Hrg 
Tr., p.96, Ls.21-22.) 
Detective Loveland, and her partner Detective Bustos, also had 
information from "several sources that Darren Parton was involved" with Leer 
"and was actually delivering methamphetamine." (#31559, Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.93, 
Ls.5-11.) On April 19, 2004, Detective Loveland corroborated there was a 
relationship between Parton and Leer by driving by Leer's home, which Wolf had 
described to. them on April 13, and observing Parton's car parked in front. 
(#31559, Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.95, L.8 - p.98, L.lO.) Detective Loveland was familiar 
with Parton's car from a previous investigation involving narcotics. (#31559, 
Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.98, Ls.11-20.) That same day, Detectives Loveland and Bustos 
went to the Shilo Inn and learned Martha Maxwell, who was Parton's girlfriend, 
was renting the room Wolf and Stevens told them about. (#31559 , Supp. Hrg. 
Tr.,p.98,L.23-p.99,L.12.) 
Wolfs and Stevens' claim that Leer was supplying drugs was also 
consistent with information Detective Loveland had obtained from "several of 
[her] contacts and interviews throughout the whole two months [she] had been in 
narcs," including information she received from a confidential informant. 
(#31559, Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.103, L.19 - p.104, L.8.) The confidential informant 
had provided information regarding Parton's involvement with drugs 
approximately "15 times" during March and April, 2004, including information that 
Parton's source was named "Billy." (#31559, Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.120, L.l - p.122, 
L.22.) When asked how she verified the information received from the 
confidential informant, Detective Loveland explained: "She gives me 
descriptions, addresses, phone numbers, first and last names, and license 
plates. I'll drive by the addresses, make sure those plates are there; do a little 
background check on the names that she gives me. I've also purchased with 
them." (#31559, Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.120, L.24 - p.121, L.4.) Detective Loveland 
further testified the confidential informant had given her the names of "six to 
seven" people involved in narcotics trafficking and Detective Loveland had been 
able to independently verify that three of those people were in fact dealing drugs. 
(#31559, Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.121, L.14 - p.122, L.16.) The confidential informant 
also told Detective Loveland Parton usually carries the drugs he sells "in a 
vehicle and does parking lot deals," and, more specifically, a red Subaru or an 
"older model" GMC Jimmy. (#31559, Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.122, L.23 - p.123, L.5.) 
The stop of Parton's vehicle, which Leer was driving, occurred on April 21, 
2004, just two days after Detectives Loveland and Bustos confirmed Parton's 
girlfriend was renting Room 343 at the Shilo Inn, and within one week of Wolfs 
and Stevens' arrests. As noted by the district court, the stop occurred after 
Detectives Loveland and Bustos saw Parton's red Subaru leave the Shilo Inn 
parking lot where the detectives were conducting surveillance. (#31559, Supp. 
Hrg. Tr., p.99, L.20-p.102, L.7.) 
Wolf and Stevens are known citizen informants and, although they are 
undoubtedly members of the criminal milieu, the information they provided to law 
enforcement had adequate indicia of reliability. Both Wolfs and Stevens' 
knowledge was based upon personal obse~ations and both acknowledged their 
participation in the criminal activity. Moreover, much of the information they 
provided was independently corroborated by law enforcement through 
surveillance and through other sources, including a confidential informant who 
had provided recent, reliable, and verified information regarding narcotics 
activities. Leer's arguments that the information was not reliable because Wolf 
and Stevens have "felony histories" and are "drug users," and allegedly had an 
"incentive to provide any information, false or otherwise," lack merit. (Opening 
Brief of Appellant, pp.24-25.) Wolf's and Steven's status as felons and drug 
users only means "more information may be necessary," Chapman, 146 ldaho at 
_ _ I  194 P.3d at 555, it does not render their information per se unreliable. The 
"more information" "necessary" was present in this case; namely, their 
acknowledgment of involvement in drug dealing and their personal knowledge 
regarding Leer's involvement, which was corroborated by other sources. Dunlap, 
126 ldaho at 907, 894 P.2d at 140; Varsovich, 113 ldaho at 356, 743 P.2d at 
1009. Moreover, while Leer may wish to minimize the criminal liability Wolf and 
Stevens faced if they provided false information (Opening Brief of Appellant, 
p.26), the ldaho Supreme Court has specifically recognized "whether the 
informant could be held criminally liable if the report were discovered to be false," 
which is a possibility in ldaho, weighs in favor of reliability. Bishop, 203 P.3d at 
1211, 1212 (citing I.C. § 18-705 "which makes it a crime to 'knowingly give[ ] a 
false report to any peace officer"). 
Leer's claim that the information was unreliable because it was "stale" also 
lacks merit. The information provided by Wolf and Stevens was relayed within 
one week of Leer's detention and was corroborated by independent investigation 
confirming Parton's, and ultimately Leer's, presence at the Shilo Inn, and was 
consistent with information regarding ongoing drug activities provided by the 
confidential information, which was also confirmed by law enforcement. This 
information was not "stale" under any reasonable interpretation of the facts. 
State v. Alexander, 138 ldaho 18, 24-25, 56 P.3d 780, 786-87 (Ct. App. 2002) 
(information obtained regarding narcotics activities during two weeks prior to 
issuance of warrant was not stale); State v. Carlson, 134 ldaho 471, 477-78, 4 
P.3d 1122, 1128-29 (Ct. App. 2000) (24-day lapse between initial observation of 
marijuana grow and issuance of warrant did not render information stale, 
particularly since there was a second report three days prior to issuance); State 
v. Turnbeauoh, 110 ldaho 11, 14, 713 P.2d 447, 450 (Ct. App. 1985) (certain 
nefarious activities, such as narcotics trafficking, are continuing in nature and, as 
a result, are less likely to become stale even over an extended period of time); 
State v. Gomez, 101 ldaho 802, 808, 623 P.2d 110, 116 (1980) (where the 
nature of the criminal conduct is protracted or continuous nature, a time delay in 
the sequence of events is of less significance). 
Because Leer did not challenge the reliability of the information upon 
which law enforcement was basing its detention in district court, Leer was not 
prejudiced by Lehtinen's failure to challenge the denial of the suppression motion 
on this basis for the first time on appeal. Even if Lehtinen could have challenged 
the stop on this basis, Leer has failed to establish prejudice as a result of his 
failure to do so since the information provided by Wolf, Stevens, and the 
confidential information had adequate indicia reliability to support a TE?m/ stop; 
consequently, Leer would not have prevailed on the suppression issue on 
appeal. 
E. Leer Has Failed To Establish Appellate Counsel Was Ineffective For 
"Vitiatrinal The Plea Aareement" And Denvina Leer "The Bargained For 
Benefit Of Appellate Review Of His Suppression Motion" 
Leer argues he was "also denied effective assistance of appellate counsel 
when counsel vitiated his plea agreement by denying him the bargained for 
benefit of appellate review of his suppression motion." (Opening Brief of 
Appellant, p.28.) According to Leer, the ldaho Rules of Professional Conduct 
require an attorney to "err on the side of presenting issues rather than refusing to 
present them" even if the claims are frivolous. (Opening Brief of Appellant, p.29 
(citing I.R.P.C. 3.1)) Leer further contends Lehtinen's failure to raise the 
suppression issue, even if it "was not so clearly meritorious," violates the Rules of 
Professional Conduct and, as such, constitutes deficient performance. Leer's 
claim fails. 
The ldaho Rules of Professional Conduct do not require an attorney to 
raise a non-meritorious issue just because his client instructs him to do so. As 
noted by Leer, I.R.P.C. 3.1 provides: 
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or 
controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact 
for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith 
argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. 
A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding that could result 
in incarceration, may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to 
require that every element of the case be established. 
As also noted by Leer, the commentary to I.R.P.C. 3.1 states: "The 
lawyer's obligations under this Rule are subordinate to federal and state 
constitutional law that entitles a defendant in a criminal matter to the assistance 
of counsel in presenting a claim that otherwise would be prohibited under this 
Rule." I.R.P.C. 3.1, Commentary [3]. However, neither the Rule nor its 
commentary can be read to require an attorney to raise a non-meritorious issue. 
Indeed, the Rule itself stands for the contrary. While the commentary 
subordinates the attorney's obligation under the Rule to the Constitution, not 
even the Constitution requires the proposition urged by Leer. As discussed in 
section ll.D, supra, Lehtinen's performance in this case was not contrary to his 
Constitutional obligations. This conclusion remains even when the issue is 
rephrased as ineffective assistance of counsel for "vitiat[ing]" the plea agreement. 
Moreover, Leer did receive the benefit of his bargain - the right to raise 
the suppression issue on appeal. The preservation of that right did not, however, 
impose a contractual, much less a constitutional, duty upon Lehtinen to pursue 
the issue on appeal. Once Lehtinen concluded he could not "in good 
conscience" raise the issue on appeal, he was not required to do so by the 
Constitution, much less the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
Leer's reliance on Roe v. Flores-Orteqa, 528 U.S. 470 (2000), in support 
of a contrary conclusion is unpersuasive. (Opening Brief of Appellant, pp.30-32.) 
At issue in Flores-Ortega was whether counsel is "deficient for not filing a notice 
of appeal when the defendant has not clearly conveyed his wishes one way or 
the other." at 477. In answering this question, the Court refused to adopt a 
bright-line rule that would require an attorney to "file a notice of appeal unless the 
defendant specifically instructs otherwise," concluding such a rule would be 
inconsistent with Strickland. & at 478. The Court instead held: 
[Clounsel has a constitutionally imposed duty to consult with the 
defendant about an appeal when there is reason to think either (1)  
that a rational defendant would want to appeal (for example, 
because there are nonfrivolous grounds for appeal), or (2) that this 
particular defendant reasonably demonstrated to counsel that he 
was interested in appealing. In making this determination, courts 
must take into account all the information counsel knew or should 
have known. Although not determinative, a highly relevant factor in 
this inquiry will be whether the conviction follows a trial or a guilty 
plea, both because a guilty plea reduces the scope of potentially 
appealable issues and because such a plea may indicate that the 
defendant seeks an end to judicial proceedings. Even in cases 
where the defendant pleads guilty, the court must consider such 
factors as whether the defendant received the sentence bargained 
for as part of the plea and whether the plea expressly reserved or 
waived some or all appeal rights. 
Flores-Orteaa, 528 U.S. at 480 (citations omitted). 
The primary distinction between Flores-Ortega and Leer's case is readily 
apparent - this case does not involve counsel's failure to file a notice of appeal. 
Although the Court in Flores-Ortega noted that preservation of an appellate issue 
in a conditional guilty plea would be relevant to determining whether trial counsel 
was deficient for failing to file a notice of appeal, or consult with his client 
regarding the client's desire to do so, this reference does not translate into a 
determination that appellate counsel, who is different than trial counsel who 
deemed it appropriate to preserve a particular issue, must raise the preserved 
issue or be deemed deficient even though appellate counsel feels the issue 
cannot, "in good conscience," be raised on appeal. Rather, the Court 
emphasized that Strickland claims require a "circumstance-specific 
reasonableness inquiry." 528 U.S. at 478. This emphasis is evident in the 
Court's cases involving ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims. See, 
a, Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, Jones, 463 U.S. 745. Here, the reasonableness 
inquiry leads to the conclusion that counsel was not deficient. 
Leer also cites Flores-Orteqa for the proposition that Lehtinen's failure to 
pursue the suppression issue "is prejudice per se." (Opening Brief of Appellant, 
p.32.) Flores-Orteqa supports no such proposition. Indeed, the Court in Flores- 
Orteaa specifically rejected a per se prejudice rule even though the defendant 
was denied "the entire judicial proceeding itself," concluding such a rule "ignores 
the critical requirement that counsel's deficient performance must actually cause 
the forfeiture of the defendant's appeal." 528 U.S. at 483-84. Thus, the Court 
held, the defendant must still establish prejudice by "demonstrat[ing] that, but for 
counsel's deficient performance, he would have appealed." Id_ at 484. The 
Court of Appeals has also previously rejected a claim that prejudice should be 
presumed on a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure to 
raise an issue on appeal. m, 144 Idaho at 660-61, 168 P.3d at 44-45. 
Not only is Leer not entitled to a per se determination of prejudice, he 
failed to demonstrate that "but for counsel's [allegedly] deficient performance, he 
would have" raised the suppression issue. If Leer believed Lehtinen's failure to 
do so was deficient because it somehow deprived him of the "benefit of his 
bargain," Leer could have elected to pursue the issue pro se by seeking leave to 
dismiss Lehtinen as his attorney and file a substitute brief. Leer failed to do so. 
(511108 Tr., p.37, L.21 - p.38, L.21 (Lehtinen testified that after he told Leer he 
decided not to pursue the suppression issue, Leer was "displeased" but never 
said he wanted Lehtinen to withdraw or to pursue the issue on his own).) 
Consequently, Leer cannot establish any prejudice. 
Because Leer failed to establish Lehtinen's performance was deficient, or 
that he suffered resulting prejudice, he has failed to establish error in the district 
court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order denying Leer's petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 2gth day of April 2009. 
JE$~ICA M. LORELLO 
~ e ~ y t ~  Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2gth day of April 2009, 1 caused two true 
and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed in the 
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
Dennis Benjamin 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLET LLP 
303 West Bannock 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Attorney General 
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Case Number Result Page 
Ada 
3 Cases Found. 
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State of Idaho vs. William Glen Leer 
No hearings scheduled 
CR-FE-2004-0000755 District Ronald J. 2ase: Closed pending o ld  Case: H0400755 Judge: wigper Am~~~t$26,000.00 clerk action 
M0404649 
Violation Charge Charges: Dat Citation Disposition e 
04/21/2004 Original: 137-2732 (F) Controlled Finding: Change Plea to 
Substance Violation Guilty Before Trial 
Amended: 137-2732(B)(A)(4) Disposition 
Trafficking in Controlled Substance date: 11/16/2004 
Arresting Officer: Unknown Officer,, Fineslfees: $25,000.00 
AD Credited time (Yes): 260 
days 
Det Penitentiary: 20 years 
04/21/2004 Original: 137-2732(B) Counterfeit 
Substance-create,del,poss Wlintent 
Del Finding: Transferred 
Amended: 137-2732(B)(A)(2) Disposition 
Trafficking in Cocaine date: 12/21/2004 
Arresting Officer: Unknown Officer,, Fineslfees: $0.00 
AD 
04/21/2004 Original: 137-2732(B) Counterfeit 
Substance-create,del,poss Wlintent 
Del Finding: Transferred 
Amended: 137-2732(B)(A)(I)(A) Disposition 
Trafficking in Marijuana date: 12/21/2004 
Arresting Officer: Unknown Officer,, Fineslfees: $0.00 
AD 
04/2112004 Original: 137-2732(B)(A)(l)(A) 
Traffickina in Mariiuana Findina: Transferred 
~mendedr118-3316 Firearm-unlawful ~ i s ~ o s t i o n  
Possession Bv Convicted Felon date: 1212112004 
Arresting officer: Unknown Officer,, Fineslfees: $0.00 
AD 
04/21/2004 Original: 118-3316 Firearm-unlawful 
Possession Bv Convicted Felon Findina: Transferred 
Amended: IX<~-705 (M) RESISTING 
AND OBSTRUCTING OFFICERS 
~ i s ~ o G t i o n  
date: 12/21/2004 
Arresting Officer: Unknown Officer,, Fineslfees: $0.00 
AD 
Register 
of Date 
actions: 
06/03/2004 Case Created - Bind Over M0404649 
06/03/2004 Charge number I :  Committment and Papers 
06/03/2004 Charge number 1: Defendant Transferred In - M0404649 D.O1 
06/03/2004 Charge number I :  Count Bound From - M0404649 D.O1 C.OO1 
06/03/2004 Charge number 1: Bond Transferred From - M0404649 D.01 C.001 
06/03/2004 Charge number 2: Count Bound From - M0404649 D.O1 C.002 
06/03/2004 Charge number 2: Bond Transferred From - M0404649 D.01 C.002 
06/03/2004 Charge number 3: Count Bound From - M0404649 D.O1 C.003 
06/03/2004 Charge number 3: Bond Transferred From - M0404649 D.O1 C.003 
06/03/2004 Charge number 4: Count Bound From - M0404649 D.O1 C.004 
06/03/2004 Finger Print Card# Added 
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06/03/2004 Charge number 5: Count Bound From - M0404649 D.O1 C.005 
06/03/2004 Finger Print Card# Added 
06/03/2004 Event Scheduled - 0900 - 06/15/2004 
06/10/2004 Information and Papers Filed 
06/11/2004 Motion -for Bond Reduction & Notice of Hearing 
06/11/2004 Motion -for PH Transcript at County Expense 
06/15/2004 Arraignment 
06/15/2004 Charge number I: Not Guilty Plea 
06/15/2004 Charge number 2: Not Guilty Plea 
06/15/2004 Charge number 3: Not Guilty Plea 
06/15/2004 Charge number 4: Not Guilty Plea 
06/15/2004 Charge number 5: Not Guilty Plea 
06/15/2004 Jury Trial Set - 09/15/2004 
06/15/2004 Event Scheduled - Pre-Trial Conference - 08/31/2004 
06/16/2004 Order - for Prelim Trnscrpt 
06/18/2004 Notice - of Jury Trial 
06/18/2004 Notice -of  Preparation of Transcript 
07/12/2004 PH Transcript Filed 
07/16/2004 Motion - to Suppress Evidence 
07/19/2004 Notice - of Hearing 
07/19/2004 Event Scheduled - Hearing - 08/12/2004 
07/28/2004 Notice - of Intent to Use IRE 404(b) & ICR 16 
07/28/2004 Statelcity Request for Discovery 
07/26/2004 Statelcity Response to Disc. Req. 
08/04/2004 Defendant Response to Disc. Req. 
08/06/2004 Notice - of Hearing 
08/06/2004 Motion - to  Continue 
08/12/2004 Hearing 
06/12/2004 Event Scheduled - Hearing - 09/13/2004 
08/12/2004 Jury Trial Set - 11/17/2004 
08/12/2004 Event Scheduled - Pre-Trial Conference - 11/09/2004 
08/13/2004 Notice - of Jury Trial 
09/09/2004 Event Scheduled - Hearing - 0911 712004 
09/10/2004 Ammended Notice of Hearing 
09/17/2004 Hearing 
09/20/2004 Affid. of Leer 
10/01/2004 Brief Lodged 
10/01/2004 States Opposition to Defend Motion to Supresws 
10/29/2004 Order - Denying Motion to Suppress 
11/09/2004 Pre-Trial Conference 
11/09/2004 Event Scheduled - Pre-Trial Conference - 11/16/2004 
11/16/2004 Pre-Trial Conference 
11/16/2004 Event Scheduled - Pie-Trial Conference - 11/16/2004 
11/16/2004 Pre-Trial Conference 
11/16/2004 Charge number I :  Change Plea to Guilty Before Trial 
11/16/2004 Event Scheduled - Sentencing Hearing - 12/21/2004 
1111 812004 Plea Form 
11/18/2004 Cond. Guilty Piea 
12/21/2004 Sentence Hearing 
12/21/2004 Charge number I :  Final Judgment, Order or Decree 
12/21/2004 Charge number 1. Sentenced to Fine & Costs - $25000.00 
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01/20/2004 Arraignment 
01/20/2004 Charge number I: Not Guilty Plea 
01/20/2004 Jury Trial Set - 05/13/2004 
01/20/2004 Event Scheduled - Pre-Trial Conference - 04/21/2004 
04/21/2004 Pre-Trial Conference 
04/21/2004 Order Appointing Public Defender 
04/26/2004 Defendant Request For Discovery 
04/30/2004 Statelcity Request for Discovery 
04/30/2004 Statelcity Response to Disc. Req. 
05/13/2004 Charge number 1: Charge Amended From - S 18-2403-1P M PET T 
05/13/2004 Charge number I: To - S 18-4626 M THEFT 
05/13/2004 Jury Trial 
05/13/2004 Charge number I :  Change Plea to Guilty BeforeTnal 
05/13/2004 Charge number I :  Final Judgment, Order or Decree 
05/13/2004 Charge number 1: Sentenced to Fine & Costs - $138.50 
05/13/2004 Charge number I :  Sentenced to Jail - 60d 60d sp 
05/13/2004 Charge number I :  Placed on Supervised Probation - 1y Standard Terms 
05/13/2004 Charge number 1: Fine Agreement Set - 137806 
05/13/2004 Charge number 1: Partial Payment - A1655543 $50.50 
05/21/2004 Charge number 1: Final Payment - A1658003 $88.00 
Motion -for BW for PV for Contact ProbINew Crimes-M0409814/ 
10/06/2004 M0411148/H0401302 
10/14/2004 Bench Warrant Created - M0400755.01-01 
10/14/2004 Amended Complaint 
10/14/2004 Bench Warrant issued - M0400755.01-01 - 10/14/2004 
10/16/2004 Charge number 2: Arrested on Warrant. Sequence# - .01 
10/16/2004 Arrested on Warrant, Sequence# - 10/18/2004 
10/16/2004 Bond Out Clerk Appearance - 11/01/2004 Thru - 11/08/2004 
10/18/2004 Warrant Return Filed 
11/01/2004 Order Appointing Public Defender 
11/01/2004 Event Scheduled - PV Hearing - 02/14/2005 
11/05/2004 Defendant Request For Discovery 
11/10/2004 Statelcity Request for Discovery 
11/10/2004 Statelcity Response to Disc. Req. 
02/14/2005 Charge number 2: Guilty Plea 
02/14/2005 Charge number 2: Final Judgment, Order or Decree 
02/14/2005 Order - Reorder 5 d Jail/ Prob to 5/13/05/ Convert to Unsup. 
04/27/2005 Bench Warrant Created - M0400755.01-02 
04/27/2005 Amended Complaint 
05/03/2005 Motion - for BW for PV for 5d Jaii 
05/09/2005 Bench Warrant Issued - M0400755.01-02 - 05/09/2005 
05/10/2005 Charge number 3: Arrested on Warrant, Sequence# - .02 
05/10/2005 Arrested on Warrant, Sequence# - 0511 112005 
05/11/2005 Warrant Return Filed 
0511 1/2005 Video Arraignment -Video Arraignment - 0511 1/2005 
0511 112005 Video Arraignment 
05/11/2005 Charge number 3: Guilty Plea 
0511 112005 Charge number 3: Final Judgment. Order or Decree 
0511 112005 Charge number 3: Sentenced to Jaii - 2d 2d cr 
0511 112005 R;-order 5days jail 

Idaho Repository - Case Number Result Page 
1 State of Idaho vs. Daniel Salinas 
I No hearings scheduled 
1 Magistrate 
CR-IN-2004-0000755 Magistrate Judge: Court Clerk iCase: Old Case: TO400755 
Arnount$O.OO d e: Closed 
Violation Charge i Charges: Dat Citation Disposition e 
01/04/2004 149-1232 {I) Insurance-fail To Provide 1004321 Finding: Treatment 
Proof Of Insurance Diversion 
Arresting Officer: Farmer, Cole, BO Disposition 
date: 01/15/2004 
Fineslfees: $0.00 
Register 
of Date 
actions: 
01/07/2004 Charge number I :  Case Opened 
01/07/2004 First Appearance - 01/23/2004 
01/15/2004 First Appearance 
Connection: Secure 



